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Case No. 20070895-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Bryan J. Tavenner, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for burglary, unlawful transportation of 
hazardous waste, and unlawful disposal of hazardous waste, all third degree 
felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 
2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Has Defendant established that it was plain error to submit this case to the 
jury? 
Standard of Review. Defendant admits that he failed to preserve the sufficiency 
claim he now raises. Brief of Appellant [BrAplt.] at 2. He concedes the issue is 
waived unless he establishes that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte 
dismissing the information. Id. at 28-30. To establish plain error, Defendant must 
show that, when the facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, there is "no evidence to support an essential element of 
a criminal charge" and "the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the 
trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ ff 
2 & 17,10 P.3d 346 (emphasis in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following controlling provisions are set forth in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-102 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-113 (West Supp. 2007); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2005, Defendant was charged with burglary of Pioneer Valley Hospital's 
hazardous waste shed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202 (West 2004), and unlawful transportation and unlawful disposal of hazardous 
waste, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-113 (West Supp. 
2007) (R. 1-4). 
Following bindover, Defendant moved to quash the information (R. 41-51). 
He claimed that the Health Department's disposal of the stolen medical waste, after 
it was found in a grocery store dumpster, prevented its testing to determine if it was 
2 
actually infectious (R.45-48; R163:2-4.8-10). The prosecutor explained that testing 
of the stolen medical waste was not required because statutorily, all waste that is 
potentially infectious is defined as hazardous (R163:4-5).l The prosecutor further 
explained that once the stolen medical waste was recovered, its immediate disposal 
was legally mandated pursuant to hazardous waste regulation and, thus, its 
destruction involved no bad faith (R163:7-8). The court denied Defendant's motion 
(R163:10). Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
A two-day jury trial began on August 14,2007 (R. 96-102). At the close of the 
prosecution's case-in-chief, Defendant again moved to dismiss on the ground that 
there was no proof that the stolen medical waste was, in fact, infectious (R165:259-
60). The trial court again denied the motion (R165:261). Defendant also moved to 
dismiss because the eyewitness identification of him was "questionable" (id.). The 
court denied the motion, ruling that the weight to be accorded the identification was 
a jury determination (id.). Defendant does not challenge these rulings on appeal. 
The jury convicted Defendant as charged (R165:323-24). On October 5,2007, 
Defendant was sentenced to three concurrent terms of one-to-five-years 
imprisonment (R. 144-47). The terms were suspended and Defendant placed on 
1
 See Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-102(9), (12) & (17) (West 2004) (Add. A). 
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probation on condition that he serve 90 days in jail and comply with other terms of 
probation (id.). Defendant timely appealed (R. 150-51). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 5, 2005, approximately 75 pounds of dirty and bloody medical 
waste, all of which was hazardous, was found in and around a grocery store 
dumpster in West Valley, Utah (R165: 174-80). See Addenda B&C (Exhibits 15,17, 
19, 21 & 23: Photographs of Medical Waste & Broken Vials).2 Earlier that day, the 
medical waste was stolen from Pioneer Valley Hospital's hazardous waste shed, 
located about fourteen blocks due east from the strip mall (R164:79-82,113-14,120, 
132-33,160-61). See Addendum E (Exhibit 14: Aerial Map). 
Disposal of Medical Waste at Pioneer Valley Hospital 
Pioneer Valley Hospital has individual bio-hazardous containers on its floors 
for collection of its medical waste. Designated hospital maintenance workers collect 
the individual containers, place them in either large red plastic garbage bags or 55-
gallon drums—both marked "caution bio-hazardous waste" — and lock them in a 
hazardous waste shed that is adjacent to the hospital. (R.165: 213-17). The locked 
shed is posted with signs that warn: 
2
 The State has attached to its addenda only some of the many photographic 
exhibits in this case. Exhibits 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 & 29 also contain 




Infectious Waste Storage Area 
Unauthorized Persons 
KEEP OUT 
(R165: 218). See also Addendum D (Exhibits 10-12: Photographs of Shed). A licensed 
bio-hazardous waste disposal company periodically collects the medical waste in 
the shed for appropriate transport and disposal (R165:217). 
The hazardous waste shed is located on the south side of the hospital in an 
area that is not public (R164: 80,102-03, 111). Near the shed is a loading dock with 
a door leading into the hospital. The door is locked and can only be unlocked by a 
security employee who visually monitors the door (R164:102-03). There is a small 
parking lot, but only hospital maintenance workers may park there (R164: 79-80, 
102, 111). A short sidewalk leads from the parking lot to the hazardous waste shed; 
next to the shed is a dumpster used for regular garbage (R164:82-83,106). See Add. 
D. 
The parking lot and dock near the hazardous waste shed are under camera 
surveillance and constantly monitored by security employees who see the camera 
images in real time on color security monitors (R164: 78-79). The sidewalk leading 
to the shed is also under camera surveillance, but the shed cannot be seen on camera 
(R164:102). Nevertheless, the sidewalk only leads to the shed and dumpster and, 
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consequently, persons walking to or from the area can be seen (R164: 83-85,105-6). 
See Add. D & Exhibit 35 (DVD Copy of March 5 Video Surveillance Tape). 
Defendant's Unauthorized Activity Near the Hazardous Waste Shed 
On March 3,2005, two days before the hospital's hazardous waste shed was 
burglarized, security employee Sulieti Lutui monitored the hospital's surveillance 
cameras during the graveyard shift (R164: 78, 88). She was experienced, having 
watched the monitors for four to five years, and found the pictures displayed on the 
monitors clear and easy to see (id.).3 Sometime in the middle of the night, Lutui 
observed a red car drive into the restricted south parking lot and park (R164:80,85-
86, 89-90). The male driver got out of the car, walked and looked around the 
parking lot suspiciously, got back in the car, and drove away (R164:83-86). She did 
not see the driver's face (id.). 
The next night, March 4, 2005, Lutui was again watching the security 
monitors during the graveyard shift (R164:79). She again saw the red car drive into 
the restricted south parking lot and park (R164: 80, 89-90). The male driver again 
got out of the car, but this time, he looked directly at one of the surveillance 
cameras. Lutui could clearly see the man's face and later identified him as 
3
 Lutui was shown trial exhibits containing stills and moving images taken 
from the surveillaince cameras (R164: 87-88, 101, 288). She explained that the 
exhibits were not as clear as what she could see in real time on the security monitors 
(id.). 
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Defendant (R164:86,89,98,109,124-25). As Defendant looked towards the camera, 
he appeared to be "wondering, 'Is this a camera or not'" (R164:86). He then walked 
down the sidewalk towards the hazardous waste shed and garbage dumpster until 
he disappeared from camera view (R164; 81-83, 86,107-09). He reappeared with 
bags and/or a box in his hands and walked to his car (id.). Lutui called for a 
security guard (id.). The security guard was involved in another emergency and 
could not immediately respond (id.). By the time the guard arrived, Defendant was 
gone (id.). The hazardous waste shed was not damaged that night (R164:116). 
The Burglary 
The following night, March 5,2005, Defendant burglarized the shed. Around 
1:30 a.m., Lutui watched as Defendant drove his red car into the restricted south 
parking lot for the third time in as many nights (R164: 79-80). This time, when 
Defendant parked, he "pulled over more toward where the camera wasn't" (R164: 
86-87). As he had the night before, Defendant got out of the car, walked down the 
sidewalk towards the dumpster and hazardous waste shed, and temporarily 
disappeared from camera view (R164: 82,105-06).4 . 
4
 Lutui was unable to see Defendant's face on March 5 (R164: 89-90). 
Nevertheless, based on his physical characteristics, behavior, and vehicle, she 
believed it was Defendant (R164:104-05). Defendant later admitted that he was in 
the parking lot on March 5 (R164:149-50; R165: 265-66). 
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Defendant reappeared carrying bags and/ or a box, which he put inside in his 
car; he then walked back towards the hazardous waste shed (R164: 79-82,99-100). 
Lutui called for a security guard, but Defendant moved quickly, completing three to 
four trips before the guard arrived (R164:82,92). As the guard approached with his 
flashlight shining, Defendant drove "erratically" out of the parking lot (R164: 111). 
The guard could tell the fleeing car was a red Stratus and memorized its license 
plate number, "041 MYA" (R164:111-12).5 
After Defendant fled, the security guard checked the shed for signs of a break-
in. Its lock and door hinges were broken (R164:113 & 116-17). Two hours earlier, 
the same security guard had checked the hazardous waste shed and found it locked 
and intact (R164:114-16). A police officer, called to the scene, also saw the shed's 
"lock busted and the wood . . . holding the lock latch . . . busted off" and it 
"appeared that someone had busted into the shed" (R164:133). The officer looked 
inside and saw red plastic bags and drums full of hazardous waste, but without 
5
 Two surveillance cameras recorded Defendant from the time he drove into 
the lot until he fled. See Exh. 35 (DVD of Surveillance Tape). A DVD copy was 
played for the jury in open court and, at their request, was provided to them on a 
laptop computer during deliberations (R165: 286-88 & 290). The DVD is "grainy" 
and "jumpy" and requires multiple viewings to fully distinguish images. Lutui 
explained that she could more clearly see and distinguish images on her color 
security monitor (R165: 288). The surveillance tape's contents will be discussed in 
detail in argument. In sum, Exhibit 35 fully corroborates Lutui's account of 
Defendant's actions on March 5. 
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knowing the shed's original contents, he could not determine if anything was 
removed (R164:133-34). 
However, the hospital maintenance worker, who had collected and locked the 
medical waste in the shed that day, later verified that medical waste had in fact been 
removed. Accompanied by a health department officer, the maintenance worker 
subsequently examined the inside of the hazardous waste shed (R164:113,134-35, 
219-220,244-45). He determined that "things were removed because of the way Pie] 
had stacked everything in there" on the day of the burglary (R165: 219-20).6 
A quick vehicle registration and license check revealed that Defendant was 
the owner of the red Stratus and lived at 3757 South 5600 West," about five 
minutes" away from the hospital (R164: 137-39). The police officer immediately 
drove to Defendant's house, but neither he nor the car was there (id.). 
Discovery of the Stolen Medical Waste at a Nearby Strip Mall 
Later that day, the stolen medical waste was found three and one-half blocks 
from Defendant's house (R164:138 & 174-75; R165:240^4). See Addendum E (Exhibit 
14: Aerial Map). The stolen medical waste had been left in and around an open 
dumpster behind a grocery store at a strip mall at 3398 South 5600 West (R164:174-
6
 Although the maintenance worker did not inspect the shed until two days 
after the burglary, the shed had been re-secured with wood boards and a bar lock 
after the burglary. (R164:113,134-35, & 244-45). 
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75). See Add. B &E. Most of the waste was inside the dumpster on top of regular 
trash (R164:174-81). But on the ground in front of the dumpster, there was a large 
number of syringes and broken glass vials (R164:174-176,180-81). See Add. C. 
Salt Lake Valley Health Department officers, trained and educated in 
environmental health, were called to the strip mall (R165:173-74, 230-32). At the 
site, they found used syringes, needles, scalpels, scalpel blades, glass medication 
vials, culture swabs, specimen and blood sample vials, latex gloves, bloody tubing, a 
container of blood, individual bio-hazardous waste collection containers, red plastic 
bio-hazardous storage bags, and other bloody and dirty medical waste. (R164:174-
84; R165:233-240). See Add. B&E. They took photographs of the medical waste in 
and around the dumpster and gingerly, out of concern for their own health, 
gathered up a few vials and other items to identify the source of the waste, sealed 
the grocery store dumpster, and arranged for its immediate disposal (R165:178,182-
83,189-90,200,231-42,245-46). See Exhibit 13 (Sealed Grocery Store Dumpster). 
A health department officer testified that the only "value" in medical waste is 
its potential to contain drugs: 
[M]edical waste does include things such as syringes, needles, possibly 
discarded drugs such as drugs that could be administered through a 
skin patch like narcotics such as Fentanyl or other drugs such as that. 
So it's possible that [a thief] would wish to use them for drug use for 
themselves. 
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(R165:211). Subsequent investigation established that the medical waste was stolen 
from Pioneer Valley Hospital (R165:240-45). Based on the observations of the inside 
of the shed and observations at the grocery store dumpster, an investigating health 
department officer estimated that about 75 pounds of medical waste was stolen and 
recovered (R165: 244-45). 
Defendant's Inconsistent Responses to Police Questioning 
On March 17, 2005, Detective William McKnight interviewed Defendant 
(R164:121-22,128). At first, Defendant denied being at Pioneer Valley Hospital on 
March 5 (R164:122). After the detective told Defendant he was on the hospital's 
surveillance tape, Defendant admitted he went to Pioneer Valley to go to the 
emergency room, but claimed he left when he remembered he had no medical 
insurance (id.). The detective asked why he parked in the restricted south parking 
lot when the emergency room was on the north side of the hospital (R164: 123). 
Defendant said he parked there when he realized he did not have insurance, but 
then turned around and left (id.). When the detective told him there was video of 
him breaking into the hazardous waste shed and stealing medical waste, Defendant 
replied that he did not need to steal medical waste because he was a nurse and 
"could just get it from where he worked" (R164:123). Investigation found no record 
of the employer Defendant named or of his being a nurse or certified nursing 
assistant (R164:153-56,166). 
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On May 16,2005, Tawna Stone, an Environmental Crimes Investigator with 
the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, telephoned Defendant (R164: 147-48). 
Defendant told her that on March 5, he was treated for kidney stones at Pioneer 
Valley Hospital (R164: 148-49). Investigator Stone asked why Defendant told 
Detective McKnight that he left the hospital without being treated (id.). Defendant 
"back[-]tracked" and said he could not remember if he was treated at Pioneer Valley 
Hospital or Salt Lake Regional Hospital (id.). 
On July 13,2005, Investigator Stone interviewed Defendant in person (R164: 
149). This time, Defendant remembered that he was at Pioneer Valley Hospital on 
March 5 (R164:149). He admitted that he parked his red Stratus in the restricted 
south parking lot (id.). He claimed he sat in the car for a few minutes before he 
realized he was in the wrong parking lot and then left without getting out of his car 
(id.). He claimed that later that night, he was treated at Salt Lake Regional Hospital 
(id.). 
Defendant's Inconsistent Trial Testimony 
Defendant testified at trial (R165: 263-82). He claimed that on February 26, a 
week before the burglary, he was in pain from kidney stones and went to Pioneer 
Valley Hospital (R165:263-65,270). He said he was x-rayed, treated, and given pain 
medication (id.). Due to the potency of the pain medication, the treating doctor 
insisted that Defendant not drive himself home and, according to Defendant, 
12 
threatened to call the police if he tried to drive (id.). Defendant ignored the doctor 
and left the hospital (id.). 
Defendant denied that he drove to Pioneer Valley Hospital or parked in its 
restricted south parking lot on March 3 or 4 (R165:263,270,276-77). He admitted, 
however, that no one else drove his car on those dates (id.). He admitted that on 
March 5, he drove his car—the red Stratus, license number 041 MY A—to the 
hospital in the middle of the night and parked in the restricted south parking lot 
(R165: 263,265-66,271). 
Defendant claimed he drove to the hospital because he was in pain and 
wanted more pain medication (R165: 263, 265). He thought the Pioneer Valley 
emergency room doctors might refuse to treat him because he left the week before 
without arranging for a ride home (R165:265-66,270,271,280,281-82). He assumed 
that he would need to pay "upfront" because he had no insurance and did not want 
to pay if the doctors subsequently refused to treat him (id.). Nevertheless, he chose 
to drive to Pioneer Valley (id.). He deliberately parked in the restricted parking lot 
on the south side of the hospital so it would appear that he had walked to the 
hospital when he entered the emergency room on the north side (id.). After sitting 
in his car for a few minutes, he changed his mind (R165:265-66). He felt the Pioneer 
Valley doctors would be "suspicious" and decided to go to Salt Lake Regional 
Hospital (R165: 279-82). He insisted that while at Pioneer Valley, he never left his 
13 
car and denied walking back and forth from his car to the hazardous waste shed or 
removing any items from the area (R165: 266). But see Exh. 35 (Surveillance Tape). 
Under cross-examination, Defendant admitted that the pain medication he 
received on February 26 was injected with a syringe filled from a glass medication 
vial (R165: 271). On March 5, he went to Pioneer Valley hoping to receive similar 
pain medication (R165:265-66). The prosecutor argued this was Defendant's motive 
in burglarizing the shed and taking the medical waste: 
[Defendant] got to that hospital just a matter of weeks before, gets an 
injection in a needle, gets some good pain killing drugs. [He testified 
here that he was in a lot of pain . . . [T]he Defendant's motive was to 
come back and get more drugs that he didn't have to pay for. . . He 
wanted to come back and get some drugs for free. That's what he was 
looking for, and that's why he did this. 
(R165: 300). The jury agreed and convicted Defendant of burglary of the hospital 
storage shed, unlawful transportation of its medical waste, and the unlawful 
disposal of the waste in the grocery store dumpster only a short distance from 
Defendant's home (R. 103). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that there is no evidence to support that he burglarized the 
hazardous waste shed, i.e., that he unlawfully entered the shed with the intent to 
steal or transport hazardous waste. He also claims there is no evidence that 
14 
hazardous waste was removed from the shed and, consequently, no evidence to 
support that he unlawfully transported and disposed of the waste. 
Defendant concedes that he failed to preserve the sufficiency claim he now 
raises and, as a result, must establish plain error to prevail. Plain error, in this 
context, requires Defendant to marshal the evidence and reasonable inferences to 
support the jury verdicts and show that, even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdicts, there is no evidence to support that he burglarized the 
shed or removed hazardous waste. If Defendant establishes the evidentiary defect, 
he must then demonstrate that the insufficiency was so apparent and fundamental 
that the trial court erred as a matter of law in submitting the case to the jury. 
Defendant has failed to meet this standard. 
As a preliminary matter, Defendant's plain error argument should be 
summarily rejected because he fails to marshal the evidence that supports the 
verdicts. Though Defendant purports to marshal, he ignores material evidence, 
minimizes testimony, and fails to draw logical inferences that support the verdicts. 
When the evidence is properly marshaled, it supports that Defendant 
burglarized the hazardous waste shed, removed hazardous waste, transported it in 
his car, and then disposed of it in a grocery store dumpster. The evidence and 
reasonable inferences establish that after casing the hospital for two nights, 
Defendant broke off the shed's locks and hinges, and in the course of three to four 
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quick trips between the shed and his car, stole approximately 75 pounds of medical 
waste. When a security guard approached, Defendant fled. Between the hospital 
and his home, he threw away the medical waste in a grocery store dumpster, but 
only after breaking a large number of glass vials and syringes that potentially could 
contain drugs. When confronted by the police, he gave inconsistent explanations for 
why he was parked in a restricted area of the hospital in the middle of the night, 
which explanations conflicted with the eyewitness accounts and surveillance tape. 
And while no one actually saw Defendant enter the shed, other direct and 
circumstantial evidence support that he did. 
Moreover, Defendant cannot claim on appeal that it should have been 
apparent to the tried judge that the evidence of burglary and transportation/disposal 
was insufficient when he admitted below that the crimes occurred. By conceding 
that someone burglarized the shed and removed waste, the defense could more 
credibly argue that Defendant was misidentified as the burglar simply because he 
was in the wrong place at the wrong time. The strategy also allowed the defense to 
argue that the police failed to investigate the possibility that someone else 
committed these crimes. 
Having made that factual concession below, Defendant cannot now claim that 
it should have been apparent to the trial judge that no evidence supported that the 
shed was burglarized and waste removed. Moreover, Defendant now admits that 
16 
the evidence establishes that he lied about his activities at the hospital and, just as 
Lutui testified, he left his car, walked back and forth to the burglarized shed, and 
removed "items from the area." Br.Aplt at 16-17. This evidence, together with other 
direct and circumstantial evidence, supports that Defendant was the person who 
entered the shed and removed the waste. Consequently, there was no obvious error 
in the trial judge submitting the case to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THAT DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY 
ENTERED THE HAZARDOUS WASTE SHED, REMOVED 
MEDICAL WASTE, AND UNLAWFULLY TRANSPORTED AND 
DISPOSED OF IT; THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
SUBMITTED THE CASE TO THE JURY 
At trial, the defense conceded that someone burglarized Pioneer Valley's 
hazardous waste shed and unlawfully transported and disposed of its medical 
waste (R164: 75-77; R165: 308-13). But according to Defendant, he was not the 
burglar (id. & R165: 265-66). Defendant insisted that even though he was parked 
near the shed at or near the time of the burglary, he did not leave his car, did not 
walk to the shed, did not take any items, and did not put anything in his car. See 
Statement of Facts at 11-14. By strategically choosing to concede that someone else 
committed the crimes, the defense could more credibly argue that Defendant was 
misidentified as the burglar simply because he was in the parking lot, that is, simply 
because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time (R164: 75-77; R165: 308-11). 
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The strategy also permitted the defense to argue that the police failed to investigate 
the possibility thcit someone else committed the crimes (R165: 312 & 314). 
On appeal, Defendant acknowledges that his argument has changed. Br.Aplt. 
at 1-2. He has abandoned his trial arguments in favor of a new and unpreserved 
claim. Id. at 1-2 & 28-30. Despite his insistence at trial that he never left his car, he 
now admits that the evidence establishes that this was not truth. In fact, the 
evidence establishes that Defendant left his car, walked to the "area of the damaged 
shed" and "took unidentified items." Br.Aplt at 17. Though Defendant took 
"items," he nevertheless claims there is no evidence to support that he entered the 
shed, after its lock and hinges were broken, or that the "items" he took were medical 
waste. Br.Aplt at 16. Defendant argues that without evidence that he burglarized 
the shed and took medical waste, there is nothing to "connect" him to the waste's 
unlawful transportation and disposal. Id. Consequently, he asserts that the trial 
court plainly erred in submitting the case to the jury. Br.Aplt at 28-30. 
The argument has no merit. As a preliminary matter, Defendant's argument 
should be summarily rejected because he fails to properly marshal the evidence to 
support the jury verdicts, as required by rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Second, when the evidence is properly marshaled, it supports that 
Defendant burglarized the shed and transported and disposed of medical waste. 
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Finally, Defendant's strategic concessions below negate his appellate claim that any 
alleged evidentiary defect should have been apparent to the trial judge. 
A. Defendant must establish that an evidentiary insufficiency exists 
that should have been apparent to the trial court. 
Defendant was obligated to challenge any evidentiary insufficiencies in the 
trial court. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 14, 10 P.3d 346. In the trial court, 
Defendant raised two challenges to the trial evidence: (1) that the eyewitness 
identification was "questionable;" and (2) that the medical waste found in the 
grocery store dumpster had to be tested to prove it was infectious (R165: 259-61). 
Defendant has abandoned these arguments on appeal. Br.Aplt at 16-19. Instead, 
Defendant raises an unpreserved claim: that even though he "took items from the 
area . . . of the damaged shed," there is no evidence to support that he entered the 
shed or removed medical waste. Defendant admits that consideration of this new 
argument is waived unless he now establishes plain error. Br.Aplt at 2. 
Under Utah law, a judge in a criminal case is not obligated to sua sponte 
address the sufficiency of evidence unless requested to by a defendant. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, f 14 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o)). Nevertheless, when evidence is 
obviously deficit—such as when there is "no evidence to support an essential 
element of a criminal charge" —the trial court must dismiss the information, 
regardless of whether a defendant requests it. Id. at \ 17 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 
19 
77-17-3 (West 2004)). See Add. A (Statutes & Rules). Thus, to establish that the trial 
court plainly erred, Defendant "must demonstrate first that no evidence supports an 
element of the charged crimes and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, U 16-17. 
In determining whether an evidentiary defect exists, the appellate court does 
not sit as a second fact-finder. Rather, the Court must uphold the conviction unless, 
after viewing the evidence and logical inferences in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict, it concludes that the evidence is "'sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable... that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the Defendant committed the crime for which he . . . was convicted/" Id. 
at 118 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993)). Stated differently, 
the marshaled evidence supporting an element must be "completely lacking o r . . . 
so slight and unconvincing" that no reasonable juror could find Defendant guilty." 
Id. at f 26 (quoting State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 19, 1 5,999 R2d 565) (other citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). See State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1225 (Utah 
1989) (holding that a trial court does not err in submitting a case to the jury as long 
as "some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements 
of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
Application of this standard establishes no plain error here. 
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B. Defendant fails to properly marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdicts. 
Defendant claims there is no evidence to support that he entered Pioneer 
Valley's hazardous waste shed with the intent to transport/steal hazardous waste 
(burglary), even though the clearly marked hazardous waste shed's lock and hinges 
were broken. He also claims there is no evidence that hazardous medical waste was 
removed from the shed (transportation and disposal), even though 75 pounds of the 
hospital's medical waste was found the same day in a grocery store dumpster 
between the hospital and defendant's house. See BrAplt at 10 & 16-18. Defendant 
asserts that because there is no evidence to support his convictions, the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in submitting the case to the jury. He acknowledges that 
resolution of the issue is fact-dependent and, consequently, that all evidence 
supporting his convictions must be considered in determining if an insufficiency 
exists. See Br.Aplt. at 11-12. See also United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mt Fonds, 2006 UT 35, \ \ 24-26 & 37-38,140 P.3d 1200. He claims, however, that it 
makes no difference whether the evidence supporting his convictions is "brought to 
the court's attention by way of marshaling or by way of appellee's brief." Br.Aplt at 
12. Defendant is incorrect. 
Whenever resolution of an issue is fact-dependent, "an appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite 
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this evidence/7 the trial court erred. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 19,100 P.3d 1177; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a)(9). Merely reciting or rearguing trial evidence does not meet 
die marshaling requirement. United Park City, 2006 UT 35, f 26. Instead, Defendant 
must "'present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists/" Chen, 
2004 UT 82, f 77 (quoting Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, \ 11,51 P.3d 724). He 
"must correlate all particular items of evidence with the challenged findings and 
then convince [the appellate court] that the trial court erred in the assessment of that 
evidence to its findings/7 Id. (citing West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). This requires Defendant to play "the devil's 
advocate" and "temporarily remove [his] own prejudices and fully embrace the 
adversary's positions." Id. at % 78 (quoting Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, % 19, 57 
P.3d 1093). It does not permit Defendant to "shift the burden of marshaling by 
falsely claiming that there is no evidence in support of the trial court's findings." Id. 
Nor can he escape his marshaling duty simply because the full evidentiary picture is 
eventually brought forth in the appellee's brief. See id. (holding that an appellant 
does not fulfill his marshaling duty by "inappropriately forc[ing] an appellee to 
marshal the evidence in order to refute an appellant's assertion of the absence of 
evidence"). 
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Here, Defendant fails to meet his marshaling obligation and, therefore, the 
Court may summarily refuse to consider the merits of his argument. United Park 
City, 2006 UT 35, f t 27 & 38. 
For example, and perhaps most egregiously, Defendant fails to marshal 
Exhibit 35, the March 5 surveillance tape. He minimally states that surveillance 
existed, but he does not acknowledge that the March 5 surveillance tape was played 
to the jury, nor does he disclose its inculpatory contents. See detailed discussion of 
tape's contents, infra at 26-27. He also does not acknowledge that his trial counsel 
conceded that a burglary occurred and waste was removed (R164:75-77; R165: SOS-
IS) and does not correlate this concession with the other evidence that he removed 
"items from the area of . . . the damaged shed." Br.Aplt. at 19. He also does not 
acknowledge that he fled when the security guard arrived (R164: 111 & 116-17). See 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 23 (recognizing that flight is circumstantial evidence from 
which felonious intent may be inferred). He admits that his answers to an 
investigator were "evasive and conflicting," Br.Aplt. at 24, but fails to acknowledge 
that his statements and testimony—that he did not leave his car or remove items — 
was completely false. See Statement of Facts at 11-14 & Exh. 35 (Surveillance Tape). 
See also State v. Hawkins, 967 R2d 966, 972 (UT App. 1998) (recognizing that 
criminality may be inferred from lack of credibility). He does not acknowledge that 
no one but Defendant was near the shed at the time of the burglary. See Statement of 
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Facts at 7-8 & Exhibit 9 (Security Log). Nor does he acknowledge that the grocery 
store dumpster where the stolen medical waste was found is on a direct route 
between the hospital and his house. See Add. E (Map). These omissions illustrate 
Defendant's failure to marshal and justify summary rejection of his plain error 
argument. See United Park City, 2006 UT 35, f 27. 
C. Defendant fails to establish that an evidentiary insufficiency 
exists. 
In this case, burglary required evidence that Defendant intruded any portion 
of his body into the hazardous waste shed with the intent to remove any of its 
hazardous waste contents. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-6-201 & 202 (West 2004) (Add. 
A). Because the shed was clearly marked with signs to "Keep Out/' it makes no 
difference whether Defendant broke the lock and hinges to the shed or, as 
Defendant implies, someone else did. See Br.Aplt. at 17-19. Under either scenario, 
Defendant was clearly prohibited from entering the shed and, consequently, if he 
entered, he did so unlawfully. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1). 
Defendant's intent is similarly self-evident. The shed had conspicuous signs 
warning that it contains hazardous waste. See Statement of Facts at 5 & Add. D. It is 
not "speculative," as Defendant claims, Br.Aplt at 12, to infer from this evidence 
that anyone unlawfully entering the shed had the intent to unlawfully remove its 
hazardous waste, whether to transport or steal it. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 26 
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(reaffirming the adage that "intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom"). This is especially true where the entry 
was made in the middle of the night and Defendant's explanation for being at the 
scene was not credible. See Hawkins, 967 P.2d at 972 (recognizing that "burglarious 
intent" may be inferred from the time of entry as well as from subsequent 
"unsatisfactory explanations" for the defendant's presence). 
Here, the marshaled evidence and logical inferences supporting the burglary 
conviction include the following: 
(1) On March 3, defendant drove to the hospital's restricted parking lot in the 
middle of the night, looked around the area suspiciously, and left. The next night, 
again in the middle of the night, he parked in the same lot, appeared to be trying to 
determine if there was camera surveillance, walked to the hazardous waste shed 
and garbage dumpster, disappeared from view, then returned to his car carrying 
large bags or a box that he put in his car and drove away. The hazardous waste 
shed was not broken into on either night. See Statement of Facts at 6-7. From this 
evidence, it can be inferred that Defendant "cased" the shed area for two nights, 
decided to first remove items from the open dumpster rather then the locked shed, 
but when he discovered only ordinary trash and not drugs, returned the third night 
to break-into the locked medical waste shed. 
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(2) The third night, March 5, Defendant again drove to the restricted area in 
the middle of the night. This time, he parked farther away from the surveillance 
cameras as if to avoid detection. See Statement of Facts at 7 & Exh. 35 (Surveillance 
Tape). Lutui testified and the surveillance tape establishes what occurred next.7 
(3) At 1:32 a.m., defendant parked his car in the second row of parking in the 
restricted parking lot. He got out of his car, walked towards its rear, and then 
walked towards the shed, making a wide arch to avoid the surveillance camera. 
Exh. 35 (depicting car lights on upper right side of screen and Defendant, in the 
middle and far left of the screen, walking towards ihe shed). One minute later, at 
1:33:15, Defendant disappears from the view of one camera and does not reappear 
on that camera until 1:37:46. His movements during those four and one-half 
minutes are, however, depicted on a second camera. 
(4) The second camera shows the dumpster, looking from the hospital 
towards the parking lot. See Exh. 35 (second camera at 1:32:33). The hazardous 
waste shed is behind the dumpster, nearer the parking lot, and only partially visible 
on the screen. See Add. D (Photographs of Storage Shed) & Lutui's testimony (R164: 
7
 The tape, copied onto a DVD, was played for the jury. See nA, supra at 8. 
The DVD can be played using iTunes. The screen displays a minute and second 
counter, which the State cites to in describing the tape's contents. 
8
 On the DVD, images from the first camera are played in their entirety. After 
the screen goes to black for a few seconds, images from the second camera are 
played in their entirety. 
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82; R165: 287-88). From 1:33:27 to 1:37:44, Defendant can be detected moving 
around at the shed. Exh. 35 (second camera, very top of screen). 
(5) From 1:37:46 to 1:38:02, Defendant walks back to his car and then returns 
to the shed. Exh.35 (first camera, far right side of screen). The second camera again 
picks up his movement at the shed from 1:38:05 to 1:38:27. Exh 35 (second camera, 
top of screen). From 1:38:30 to 1:38:45, defendant again walks back to his car, 
carrying a large bag or box, and then returns to the shed without the item. Exh.35 
(first camera, far right side of screen). The second camera again picks up 
Defendant's movements at the shed from 1:38:52 to 1:39:03. Exh. 35 (second camera, 
very top of screen). At 1:39:05, Defendant walks towards his car, carrying a large 
bag or box in his hands. Exh. 35 (first camera, far right side of screen). Ten seconds 
later, at 1:39:16, the security guard, shining a flashlight in front of him, walks from 
the hospital towards the shed. Exh. 35 (second camera). The first camera picks up 
the guard as he walks closer to the parking lot. Exh. 35 (first camera). About the 
same time Defendant is spotted by the guard, Defendant sees the guard and flees 
(R164: 111 & Exh. 35). When the security guard checks the shed, he discovers that its 
lock and hinges are broken (R164:113-14). 
(6) The shed was locked and intact at 11:30 p.m. (R164:117). Between 11:30 
and 1:32 a.m., Lutui observed no suspicious person near the shed other than 
Defendant. See Exh. 9 (Security Log). If someone unauthorized had been in the 
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area, Lutui would have called security, just as she did with Defendant on March 4 
and 5 (R164:83,92 & 103). Moreover, though she could not fully see the shed on her 
security monitor, she could see anyone walking to or from the shed (R164:82,99406 
& Exh. 35). 
(7) The identification of Defendant at the shed is not at issue. See Statement of 
Facts at 7-9 & 11-13; See also Br.Aplt at 17-19 (admitting that trial evidence supports 
the identification of Defendant). 
(8) Defendant's explanations for being at the shed were not consistent or 
credible. Br.Aplt. at 24. Moreover, he testified falsely that he never left his car, 
never walked to the shed, and never removed items. See Statement of Facts at 11-14 
& Exh. 35. 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdicts, this evidence 
supports that Defendant burglarized the shed. See State v. Burch, 413 P.2d 805,806 
(Utah 1966) (holding that evidence established burglary where Burch was seen 
fleeing from an the area of an office and the office window, which had been intact 
two hours before, was now broken and burglary tools were inside); Hawkins, 967 
P.2d at 972 (recognizing that proof of burglary is "rarely susceptible of direct proof 
[and] is usually inferred from circumstantial evidence: the manner of the entry, the 
time of day, the character and contents of the building, the person's actions after 
entry, the totality of the circumstances, and the intruder's explanation," all of which 
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must be judged "in the light of human behavior and experience") (other citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 882 
(Utah 1981) (recognizing in burglary case, the logical inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence do "not disappear from a case but [go] to the fact trier to be weighed 
along with any contravening evidence"). 
The evidence to support unlawful transportation and disposal of hazardous 
wastes is equally sufficient. Defendant admits that hazardous waste was unlawfully 
transported and disposed of in the grocery store dumpster.9 Br.Aplt. at 16-17. He 
claims only that unless the evidence establishes that he burglarized the shed, there is 
no evidence to "connect" him to the waste's transportation and disposal. Id. 24-27. 
This is incorrect. For even if Defendant did not "enter" the shed, as claimed by 
Defendant, it is undisputed that he "took items from the area . . . of the damaged 
shed." Br.Aplt. at 17-19. "Items from the area" could only be medical waste from 
the shed or ordinary trash from the garbage dumpster. See Statement of Facts at 5-6. 
Given the other evidence and its logical inferences—that Defendant cased the shed 
9
 Unlawful transportation occurs when hazardous waste is moved "off-site... 
to any point of... disposal" without a permit. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-102(19) 
(West 2004) & Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-113 (West Supp. 2007) (Add. A). Unlawful 
disposal occurs when hazardous waste is "dump[ed].. . or plac[ed] . . . so that the 
waste or any constituent of the waste may enter the environment, be emitted into 
the air, or discharged into any waters, including groundwaters" without a permit. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-102(6) & 113 (Add. A). 
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area for two nights, returned on March 5 in the middle of the night, walked to the 
shed, carried large bags to his car three to four times, fled when a security guard 
approached, and subsequently falsely denied taking any items — it is reasonable to 
infer that Defendant did not take ordinary trash, but medical waste. See Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, f K 21-26; Hawkins, 967 P.2d at 971-72. Moreover, the medical waste 
was recovered in a grocery store dumpster, on a direct route from the hospital to 
Defendant's house. See Statement of Facts at 4 & 9. 
Evidence of Defendant's motive supports all three convictions. Hazardous 
waste, especially bloody and dirty infectious medical waste, as in this case, has no 
value to most people. It does, however, have value to individuals wanting drugs 
(R165: 211). Defendant admitted that on the night of the burglary he wanted pain 
medication like he had received the previous week at the same hospital. That 
medication was administered via a syringe filled from a glass vial (R165: 265-66, 
271). In this case, a large number of glass vials and syringes were found broken on 
the ground in front of the grocery store dumpster, suggesting that this waste—as 
opposed to the bloody waste inside the dumpster—was searched for drugs. 
Compare Add. B (Photographs of Waste Inside Dumpster), with Add. C (Photographs of 
Broken Vials). 
In sum, Defendant establishes no insufficiency in the evidence. 
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D. Defendant fails to establish that the alleged insufficiency should 
have been apparent to the trial court. 
Alternatively, even if an insufficiency existed, it was not apparent in light of 
the defense's factual concessions below. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 17 (requiring an 
apparent and fundamental insufficiency to establish plain error). See also Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1220 (recognizing that trial counsel's strategic decision to forego objection 
precludes a claim of plain error). 
Here, trial counsel strategically agreed that someone burglarized the shed and 
removed hazardous waste between 11:30 p.m. and 1:30 a.m. See discussion, supra at 
17-18. This bolstered the defense theory that Defendant was misidentified as the 
burglar when he innocently entered the parking lot at 1:30 a.m. and sat in his car. 
See id. See also Statement of Facts at 12-14. Other evidence supported that Defendant 
was not telling the truth. The eyewitness accounts and surveillance tape established 
that at 1:30 a.m., Defendant walked from the shed to his car three or four times, 
carrying large bags, which he put in his car, and fled as the security guard 
approached. See discussion, supra at 25-28. In light of the defense concession that 
someone burglarized the shed between 11:30 p.m. and 1:30 a.m., it would not have 




For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
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RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE R u l e 1 7 
RULE . ; THE TBI/Vi-
la) In all cases the defendant shall havt. liu.- ; \ - : : ; u - ^ u L r and defend i:i 
pcrscn and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at ihe v\iu 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, u*:-: . - ' - - •; v ; ' -
in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by dv.:.:h, ;hs dcfjndant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and ^ verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous,, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the t r ia l 
(b)' Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be. tried in the following order1 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) Felony cases when, defendant is on hail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on b^jj or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by Jury unless the defendant waives a jury in 
open court with the. approval of the court: and th e consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
w r itten demand at least ten days prior to trial, o*- the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction, 
(e) In aU cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in 
Section 78-46-5,, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defence i} iC(\, witn me :oi:.-.L.:it •;»: :::e 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation i n writing or made orally 
in open court,, proceed to trial or complete a tria] \})cn :r. rroirr-jj-s with nr.v 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled ar^ -• - * : v ../
 :J" *oceed m 
the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the de-
fense may make an opening sra.fem.enr or reserve, it until the prosecution Aas 
rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; • 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its: case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, 
for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides 
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall 
follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. 
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each 
party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate 
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed 
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written ques-
tions to a witness as provided in this section. 
(1) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the 
process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and 
does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question 
from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise 
the jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the 
question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the 
jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented 
parties and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow a 
question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the 
written question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask 
the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The 
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel 
and unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or* at a 
specified time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(/) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instruc-
tions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except 
exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the 
jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall 
permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes 
during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As 
necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the 
jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together 
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by 
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if 
they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is.,, 
rendered, communicate to any person, the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on 
any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of 
them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice
 ;of the co-"^ or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
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§ 1 9 - 6 - 1 0 2 . Definitions 
/;s jsed in this part: 
; M 'Board'1 means the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board created in 
Section 19-1-106. 
(2) "Closure plan"' means a plan under Section 19-6-108 to close a facility 
or site at which the owner or operator has disposed of nonhazardous solid 
waste or has treated, stored, or disposed of hazardous wraste including, if 
applicable; a plan to provide postclosure care at the facility or site. 
(3)(a) "Commercial nonhazardous solid waste treatment, storage, or disposal 
facility" means a facility that receives, for profit, nonhazardous solid waste for 
treatment, storage, or disposal, 
(b) "Commercial nonhaz.r ^ .• - wa.sie ;:c «:••:..•:it, storage, or dh-p-.::;al 
facility" does not include a faL.,:;j :-. ai: 
(i) receives waste for recycling; 
(ii) receives waste to be used as fuel, in compliance with federal and' 
state requirements; or 
fiii) is solely under contract with a. local government within the state to 
•se of nonhazardous solid waste generated within the boundaries of 
the local government. 
(4) "Construction waste or demolition waste": 
(a) means waste from building materials, packaging, and rubble resulting 
from construction, demolition, remodeling, and repair of pavements, houses, 
' commercial buildings, and other structures, and from, road building and land 
clearing; and 
(b) does not include: asbestos; contaminated soils or tanks resulting from 
remediation or cleanup at any release or spill; -waste paints; solvents; 
sealers; adhesives; or similar hazardous or potentially hazardous materials. 
(5) "Demolition waste" has the same meaning as the definition of construc-
tion waste in this section. 
(6) "Disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping;, spilling, 
leaking, or placing of any solid or hazardous waste into or on any land or water 
so that the w aste or any constituent of the waste may enter the environment, be 
emitted into the air, or discharged into any waters, including groundwaters. 
(7) "Executive secretary" means the executive secretary of the board. 
(8) "Generation" or "generated" means the act or process of producing 
Unhazardous solid or hazardous wTaste. 
(9) "Hazardous waste" means a solid waste or combination of solid wastes 
other than household waste which, because of its quantity, concentration, or 
physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or significantly 
contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or 
incapacitating reversible illness or may pose a substantial present or potential 
hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored 
transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed. 
(10) "Health facility" means hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, home health 
agencies, hospices, skilled nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, inter-
mediate care facilities for the mentally retarded, residential health care facili-
ties, maternity homes or birthing centers, free standing ambulatory surgical 
centers, facilities owned or operated by health maintenance organizationsfand 
state renal disease treatment centers including free standing hemodialysis units, 
the offices of private physicians and dentists whether for individual or private 
practice, veterinary clinics, and mortuaries. 
(11) "Household waste" means any waste material, including garbage, trash, 
and sanitary wastes in septic tanks, derived from households, including single-
family and multiple-family residences, hotels and motels, bunk houses, ranger 
stations, crew quarters, campgrounds, picnic grounds, and day-use recreation 
areas. 
(12) "Infectious waste" means a solid waste that contains or may reasonably 
be expected to contain pathogens of sufficient virulence and quantity that 
exposure to the waste by a susceptible host could result in an infectious disease. 
(13) "Manifest" means the form used for identifying the quantity, composi-
tion, origin, routing, and destination of hazardous waste during its transporta-
tion from the point of generation to the point of disposal, treatment, or storage. 
(14) "Mixed waste" means any material that is a hazardous waste as defined 
in this chapter and is also radioactive as defined in Section 19-3-102. 
(15) "Modification plan" means a plan under Section 19-6-108 to modify a 
facility or site for the purpose of disposing of nonhazardous solid waste or 
treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste. 
(16) "Operation plan" or "nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste operation 
plan" means a plan under Section 19-6-108 to own, construct, or operate a 
facility or site for the purpose of disposing of nonhazardous solid waste or 
treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste. 
(17)(a) "Solid waste" means any garbage, refuse, sludge, including sludge 
from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution 
control facility, or other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, 
or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, 
or agricultural operations and from community activities but does not include 
solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage or in irrigation return flows or 
discharges for which a permit is required under Title 19, Chapter 5, Water 
Quality Act, or under the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C., Section 1251, 
et seq. 
(b) "Solid waste" does not include any of the following wastes unless the 
waste causes a public nuisance or public health hazard or is otherwise 
determined to be a hazardous waste: 
(i) certain large volume wastes, such as inert construction debris used as 
fill material; 
(ii) drilling muds, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the 
exploration, development, or production of oil, gas, or geothermal energy; 
(iii) fly ash waste, bottom ash waste, slag waste, and flue gas emission 
control waste generated primarily from the combustion of coal or other 
fossil fuels; 
(iv) solid wastes from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of 
ores and minerals; or 
(v) cement kiln dust. 
(18) "Storage" means the actual or intended containment of solid or hazard-
ous waste either on a temporary basis or for a period of years in such a manner 
as not to constitute disposal of the waste. 
(19) "Transportation" means the off-site movement of solid or hazardous 
waste to any intermediate point or to any point of storage, treatment, or 
disposal. 
(20) "Treatment" means a method, technique, or process designed to change 
the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any solid or 
hazardous waste so as to neutralize the waste or render the waste nonhazard-
ous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery, anienabie to storage, or 
reduced in volume. 
(21) "Underground storage tank" means a tank which is regulated under 
Subtitle I of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 
6991, etseq. 
§ 19-6-113. Violations—Penalties—Reimbursement for expenses 
..(1) As used in this section, "RCRA" means the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq. 
(2) Any person who violates any order, plan, rule, or other requirement issued or adopted 
' under this part is subject in a civil proceeding to a penalty of not more than $13,000 per day 
for each day of violation. 
(3) On or after July 1, 1990, no person shall knowingly: 
(a) transport or cause to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed under 
this part to a facility that does not have a hazardous waste operation plan or permit under 
this part or RCRA; 
(b) treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this part: 
(i) without having obtained a hazardous waste operation plan or perm.it as required by 
this part or RCRA; 
• (ii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a hazardous waste 
operation plan or permit; or 
(iii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any rules or 
regulations under this part, or RCRA; 
(c) omit material information or make any false material statement or representation in 
any application, label, manifest, record, report, permit, operation plan, or other document 
filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with this part or RCRA or any rules 
or regulations made under this part or RCRA; and 
(d) transport or cause to be transported without a manifest, any hazardous waste 
identified or listed under this part and required by rules or regulations made under this 
part or RCRA to be accompanied by a manifest. 
(4)(a)(i) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of Subsection (3)(a) or (fa) is 
guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted of 
a felony under Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for 
each day of violation, or imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years, or both. 
(iii) If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation under Subsection (3)(a) 
or (b), the maximum punishment is double both the fine and the term of imprisonment 
authorized in Subsection (4)(a)(ii). 
(b)(i) Any person who knowingly violates any of the provisions of Subsection (3)(c) or (d) 
is guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted of 
a felony for a violation of Subsection (3)(c) or (d) is subject to a fine of not more than 
$50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment for a term, not to exceed two .years, or 
(iii) If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation under Subsection (3)(c) 
or (d), the maximum punishment is double both the fine and the imprisonment authorized 
in Subsection (4)(b)(ii). 
(c)(i) Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous 
waste identified or listed under this part in violation of Subsection (3)(a), (b), (c), or I'd), who 
knows at that time that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of deal h or 
serious bodily injury is guilty of a felony. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and ~G-?>-'U'r2, a person convicted of 
a felony described in Subsection (4)(c)(i) is subject to a fine of not more than S2o0.0;,r= r 
imprisonment for a term not to exceed 15 years, or both. 
(iii) A corporation, association, partnership, or governmental instrumentality, upon 
conviction of violating Subsection (4)(c)(i), is subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000. 
(5)(a) Except as provided in Subsections (5)(b) and (c) and Section 19-6-722, all penalties 
assessed and collected under authority of this section shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
(b) The department may reimburse itself and local governments from monies collected 
from civil penalties for qualifying extraordinary expenses incurred in qualifying environ-
mental enforcement activities. 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 78-3-14.5, the department may reimburse 
itself and local governments from monies collected from criminal fines for qualifying 
extraordinary expenses incurred in prosecutions .for violations of this part. 
(d) The department shall regulate reimbursements by making rules that define: 
(i) qualifying environmental enforcement activities; and 
(ii) qualifying extraordinary expenses. 
(6) Prosecution for criminal violations of this part may be commenced by the attorney 
general, the county attorney, or the district attorney as appropriate under Section 17-18-1 or 
17-18-1.7 in any county where venue is proper. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 76-6-21)1, Definitions 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, 
aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons or for canning on business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; 
and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected i vith the struct! ire or 
vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(?) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the 
premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not 
open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to 
enter or remain on the premises or sudh portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter'" means: 
(a,). Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(\f Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
§ 76-6-2U2. Uurfelw) 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
• (b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
.(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses 
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the 
actor while he is in the building. 
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